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Recent work on birds and non-human primates has shown that taxonomic differences
in field measures of innovation, tool use and social learning are associated with size
of the mammalian cortex and avian mesopallium and nidopallium, as well as ecological
traits like colonization success. Here, I review this literature and suggest that many of its
findings are relevant to hominin intelligence. In particular, our large brains and increased
intelligence may be partly independent of our ape phylogeny and the result of convergent
processes similar to those that have molded avian and platyrrhine intelligence. Tool use,
innovativeness and cultural transmission might be linked over our past and in our brains
as operations of domain-general intelligence. Finally, colonization of new areas may have
accompanied increases in both brain size and innovativeness in hominins as they have
in other mammals and in birds, potentially accelerating hominin evolution via behavioral
drive.
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Neuroscientists and paleoanthropologists use very different
approaches to study the relationship between intelligence and
the brain. While neuroscientists study variance between con-
temporary individuals and species, drawing on techniques like
brain imaging, intelligence tests and comparative analyses, pale-
oanthropologists focus mostly on variation over time and space
in fossils and artifacts, in particular tools. This emphasis gives
paleoanthropologists a unique insight into three key features of
human intelligence: innovation, the first appearance of a novel
technique or behavior, tool use and manufacture, and cultural
transmission, the diffusion of innovations over space and time.
Studies of tools, innovations and cultural transmission in rela-
tion to avian and non-human primate brains have become more
numerous in recent years. In this chapter, I review these stud-
ies and argue they are relevant to the neuroscience of hominin1
evolution. More specifically, the studies suggest that (1) large
brains and increased intelligence in hominins may be partly
independent of our ape phylogeny: convergence with avian and
platyrrhine cognition, not just ape cognition, may be relevant to
understanding our own; (2) tool use, innovativeness and cultural
transmission might be linked over our past and (3) in our brains;
(4) colonization of new areas may have accompanied increases
in both brain size and innovativeness in hominins as they have
in other mammals and in birds, potentially accelerating hominin
evolution via behavioral drive.
VARIATION IN INNOVATION RATE IS HIGHLY SKEWED
TOWARD A FEW PHYLOGENETICALLY INDEPENDENT TAXA
If, in archeology, cultures carry the name of the first site where
they were discovered, Swaythling and Koshima should feature
1The term “hominin” describes current humans and their immediate ances-
tors, while the terms “hominoid” and “hominid” include respectively apes and
great apes.
prominently in the terminology of non-human cultures. In 1921,
blue tits in Swaythling, a town near Southampton, were first seen
to open milk bottles on doorsteps and drink the cream accu-
mulating at the top. By 1949, the behavior had been noted in
hundreds of localities throughout England, Wales, and Ireland
(Fisher and Hinde, 1949). In the 1950’s, a young female macaque
on the Japanese island of Koshima innovated two food-washing
techniques (potato washing in 1953 and wheat placer mining in
1956) that were later seen in several members of her troop (Kawai,
1965).
For decades, the main preoccupation of researchers was
whether or not the “Swaythling bottle opening culture” and the
“Koshima food washing culture” were truly cultures, i.e., whether
social learning was behind the increase in the behaviors over
time. Critical discussions (Hinde and Fisher, 1951, 1972; Galef,
1992; Ingram, 2001; de Waal, 2003), experiments on captive ani-
mals (Sherry and Galef, 1984, 1990; Kothbauer-Hellmann, 1990;
Visalberghi and Fragaszy, 1990; Aplin et al., 2013) and statisti-
cal models of diffusion over space and time (Lefebvre, 1995a,b)
were all concerned with transmission, but no one really asked
why the innovations occurred in tits and macaques in the first
place. When, decades later, innovation rates were calculated in
birds and primates, tits and macaques were among the top gen-
era: the genus Macaca is surpassed only by Pan, Pongo, and Cebus
in Simon Reader’s primate database (Reader and Laland, 2002;
Reader et al., 2011), while the tit genus (formerly Parus, now split
into Parus, Poecile, and Cyanistes) is eighth out of 362 genera with
at least one innovation in the avian database collated by my lab
(see supplement in Overington et al., 2009, 2011).
Overall, the primate and avian data sets show two clear and
similar trends: first, some species have much higher innovation
rates than others, and second, high innovation species are found
in distant parts of the phylogenetic tree of their class or order.
In primates, 60% of all innovations occur in a single species,
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the common chimpanzee. When the innovations of orang-utans
and gorillas are added to the chimpanzee total (bonobos do
not appear in the Reader database because they are so diffi-
cult to study in the field), the proportion of innovations that
occur in great apes goes up to 75%. The genera Cebus, Papio,
and Macaca together contribute another 20%. If baboons and
macaques are not very distant in terms of molecular phylogeny
(tribe Papionini), the group they belong to, the Cercopithecinae,
is clearly very distant from the lineages that led respectively
to Cebus and the great apes (see Figure 1B in Reader et al.,
2011).
Simple counts of innovation frequency might not be the best
way to compare taxa because they are probably biased by many
factors. Species that are more populous than others or on which
more research is conducted might yield more cases of innova-
tive behavior. Up to now, thirteen such biases (often correlated
with each other) have been shown to occur in studies of avian
and primate innovation, but they are easily corrected by including
the most important ones as confounding variables in multivari-
ate analyses (Lefebvre et al., 2001; Lefebvre, 2011). When the
main bias, research effort, is taken into account, the same pri-
mate genera as before yield the highest residual innovation rates,
except for Macaca. Chimpanzees and orang-utans show stan-
dardized residuals that are clear outliers, respectively, 4 and 3.5
standard deviations above the primate average. High innovative-
ness thus seems to have evolved three or four times independently
in primates: in the great ape lineage, the capuchin lineage and
the baboon and macaque lineage (see Figure 1B in Reader et al.,
2011). The capuchin lineage has been evolving separately from
that ofHominidae and Papionini for more than 40 million years.
In birds, the distribution of innovations is also skewed toward
some taxa. The families Corvidae,Accipitridae and Laridae rank at
the top with over 200 innovations each, but none dominates the
way great apes do in primates (Lefebvre et al., 1997; Overington
et al., 2009). In birds, the ten genera with the highest innova-
tion frequencies make up only 30% of the more than 2300 cases
recorded. The taxonomic distribution of innovation rate is a bit
more skewed at higher levels, but again less so than in primates.
At four standard deviations above the avian mean, the Corvoidea
superfamily (crows, shrikes, magpies, drongos, jays) is the clear
outlier in birds when innovation rate is expressed as a residual
of research effort, but even then, its innovation frequency repre-
sents only 15% of the avian total. Within this parvorder, the genus
Corvus (ravens and crows) is an outlier at over eight standard
deviations above the avian mean, by far the highest of all genera.
Other avian clades with large residual innovation rates are rap-
tors, woodpeckers, hornbills, gulls, kingfishers, roadrunners, and
herons. Estimates of phylogenetic distances between these groups
have changed drastically over the past 25 years, but innovation
trends have proven robust (Overington et al., 2009) to major revi-
sions, e.g., from the Sibley and Ahlquist (1990) phylogeny to the
one published by Hackett et al. (2008).
In birds, variation in innovativeness has only been studied at
the species level and higher, but in primates, Reader and Laland
(2001) have also examined potential differences between males
and females, as well as differences between juveniles and adults
and high- vs. low-ranking individuals. Imo, the most famous
primate innovator, was a high-ranking juvenile female when she
invented potato and wheat washing, but trends in primates as a
whole and in chimpanzees in particular do not confirm the pic-
ture seen at Koshima. In primates in general and in chimps in
particular, males innovate significantly more than females when
we take into account the sex ratio of the populations, which is
often female biased; when sex ratio is not included in the analy-
sis, males and females innovate at rates that are not significantly
different. Across all primates, adults innovate more often than
juveniles; in chimps, however, there is no significant difference
between the two age classes. In chimps, as well as in primates in
general, low ranking individuals innovate more frequently than
mid- or high-ranking individuals.
The data on non-humans thus suggest two possibilities behind
the high innovation rate of Homo: a trait that is phylogenet-
ically shared with our hominid cousins, but also a trait that
might have been influenced by convergent, independent evolu-
tion under pressures similar to those that favored innovativeness
in Cebidae, Corvidae, and other taxa.
INNOVATION, TOOL USE AND SOCIAL LEARNING:
CO-EVOLVED COGNITIVE MODULES OR GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE?
In archeology, the study of tools, innovations and cultural trans-
mission often go together. Recent analyses (Lycett and von
Cramon-Taubadel, 2008; Lycett and Norton, 2010) on geographic
distributions of lithic technologies, for example, focus on differ-
ent modes of tool making, dates and loci of innovations (e.g., first
appearance in Africa) and models of cultural transmission from
the African areas of innovation to the farthest points of diffu-
sion east of the Movius line. The study of tool use, innovation
and cultural transmission also go together in quantitative counts
of cognition in birds and primates. Using the same method to
gather case studies on tool use and social learning (themechanism
that allows cultural transmission) as they did on innovations,
Reader and Laland (2002) found significant positive correlations
between the taxonomic distributions of the three measures. As
with innovations, the great majority of tool use cases are found
in Pan, Pongo, and Cebus; the three genera together make up
96% of recorded cases. The trends are maintained after correc-
tion for research effort: Pan, Pongo, and Cebus have corrected
tool use rates that are 2–5 standard deviations above the average
primate line.
This strong skew in the taxonomic distribution of primate tool
use is also reflected in the avian database. Seventy-two percent of
cases in the feeding domain (Lefebvre et al., 2002) and 87.5% of
cases in all tool use domains (Bentley-Condit and Smith, 2010)
are found in songbirds, the suborder Passeri. The genus Corvus
once again stands out: fifteen species in this genus feature at least
one tool use technique, with the New Caledonian species Corvus
moneduloides showing the most sophisticated forms of use, man-
ufacture and invention, as well as a causal understanding of tools,
meta-tools and proto-tools (Taylor et al., 2009).
Quantitative counts of social learning in primates follow the
same trends as do innovations and tool use. Again, chimpanzees
and orang-utans clearly dominate, making up 68% of cases
between the two of them and reaching 3–4 standard deviations
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above the mean primate line when corrected for research effort.
Cebus scores a bit lower on this measure than it does on inno-
vation and tool use, while Macaca (especially M. fuscata, the
Japanese macaque on which extensive social learning research
has been done) scores slightly higher with over 10% of primate
cases. In birds, there are surprisingly few recorded cases of social
learning of foraging behavior in the field. In primates, reports of
innovation and social learning are about equally frequent, but
in birds, there are less than 100 social learning reports (vocal-
izations excluded from this measure) for over 2300 innovation
reports (Lefebvre and Bouchard, 2003); most are concentrated in
the songbird suborder Passeri.
Taxonomic counts of tool use and innovation are positively
correlated in both birds (Lefebvre et al., 2002) and primates
(Reader and Laland, 2002; Lefebvre et al., 2004). This could be an
artifact of a common bias in the collection method for the mea-
sures, as both are based on systematic surveys of the anecdotal
literature. However, the fact that the measures also correlate with
experimental results from captive animals argues against this pos-
sibility. In birds, differences in reversal learning errors between
species from seven families correlate with both innovation rate
and size of themesopallium (Timmermans et al., 2000), while dif-
ferences in problem-solving between five species of West Indian
birds correlate with differences in innovation frequency (Webster
and Lefebvre, 2001; Lefebvre and Bolhuis, 2003). In primates,
differences in innovation rate also correlate with differences in
reversal learning in six species [(Lefebvre et al., 2004); based on
Riddell and Corl (1977) and Reader and Laland (2002)], and in
nine types of cognitive tasks in 24 genera (Deaner et al., 2006;
Reader et al., 2011).
Reader et al. (2011) have explored the idea of general intel-
ligence with a principal components analysis that included five
measures of cognition, adding Byrne and Whiten’s (1987) tac-
tical deception and Parker and Gibson’s (1979; Gibson, 1986)
extractive foraging to innovation, tool use and social learning, as
well as three lifestyle or socio-ecological measures (diet breadth,
percent frugivory, and group size). All five cognitive variables
clustered together on the first PC, while the three lifestyle mea-
sures clustered on a second, independent, PC. This suggests that
some form of general intelligence (abbreviated as g in the litera-
ture, e.g., Colom et al., 2006) might underlie the evolution of the
different cognitive measures. Interestingly, the idea that animal
intelligence includes distinct social and non-social domains was
not supported in Reader et al.’s analysis: instead of a split between
social variables (social learning, tactical deception, group size)
and non-social ones (tool use, extractive foraging, and diet), the
PCA revealed independent lifestyle and cognitive factors, whether
social or not. Deaner et al. (2006) came to the same conclusion as
Reader et al. (2011): a common general intelligence factor seems
to underlie the co-variation in performance over the nine types of
cognitive tasks they analyzed in 24 primate genera (see, however,
Amici et al., 2012).
The implication for hominins are that cognitive traits such as
innovativeness, tool use, social learning, tactical deception and
reversal learning might all have evolved together. For many years,
the dominant view in evolutionary psychology has been that
cognition is best understood as a mental tool kit that includes
several independent modules, each specialized for a particular
purpose (Samuels, 2000; Shettleworth, 2010). While some cogni-
tive features in non-humans seem to bemodular (e.g., specialized,
domain-specific and based on a dedicated neural substrate, such
as filial imprinting, song, and spatial memory), other cognitive
abilities could be better understood as domain-general processes.
The positive correlations across species suggest that there are
few trade-offs and that a species that ranks high on one cogni-
tive measure can rank high on others. Chiappe and MacDonald
(2005) have argued that selection for modular specializations
depends on repeated encounters with situations that select for
them (e.g., repeated winters killing birds that do not store food
efficiently). By definition, this cannot be the case for innova-
tion, which constantly deals with new problems rather than
repetitions of the same one. Resource defense and game theory
further predict that the spatial and temporal unpredictability of
food should drive social and ecological intelligence in similar
directions (Overington et al., 2008), which argues for concerted
selection on multiple cognitive domains rather than strict modu-
lar specialization. If we add to this evidence from brain imaging
(Colom et al., 2006; Barbey et al., 2012), genetics and intelligence
test research in contemporary humans (Plomin and Spinath,
2002) and non-humans (Galsworthy et al., 2002), it is plausible
that changes in g might lie behind many cognitive innovations
found in our hominin past. Recent papers by Deaner et al. (2006),
Byrne and Bates (2007) and van Schaik et al. (2012) have under-
lined this new interest in general vs. modular processes for the
evolution of intelligence. It should be noted here that acknowl-
edging the existence of g in no way implies that it accounts for all
(or even most) of the variance in performance over different tasks
across clades. In humans and other mammals, the proportion of
variance explained by the first PC on a battery of cognitive tests
is usually around 40% (Chabris, 2007), leaving a majority of the
variance unexplained or associated with task- or domain-specific
effects.
BIG BRAINED BIRDS AND PRIMATES HAVE HIGHER RATES
OF INNOVATION, TOOL USE, AND SOCIAL LEARNING
Several neural measures are used in comparative studies of non-
human cognition. The measures vary in the neuroanatomical
level they focus on and the extent to which body size allom-
etry is controlled for. In birds, innovation and tool use rates
are positively correlated with allometrically corrected size of the
whole brain, of the telencephalon and of the mesopallium and
nidopallium, two areas that show convergent evolution with asso-
ciation areas of the mammalian cortex (Timmermans et al., 2000;
Mehlhorn et al., 2010; Güntürkün, 2012). They are not correlated
with absolute size of the brain, due to the presence of very large-
bodied groups with poor cognitive skills such as ostriches, emus,
bustards, and turkeys. Neither the anatomical level used (whole
brain, telencephalon, or mesopallium and nidopallium) nor the
method used to correct for body size (residuals, EQ or executive
brain ratio) have an effect on the magnitude of the relationship
between innovation rate and neural substrate (Lefebvre and Sol,
2008). In primates, innovation and tool use also co-vary, as well
as correlate positively with absolute and allometrically corrected
size of the isocortex. Taxonomic differences in social learning also
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correlate with isocortex size, as well as with rates of tool use and
innovation (Reader and Laland, 2002).
One caveat is that these correlations, despite being highly sig-
nificant, do not account for a large proportion of variance. In
birds, residual brain size at the family level explains only 13.4%
of the variance in diversity of technical innovations, the best
measure of innovativeness in Overington et al. (2009) re-analysis
of the avian database. In primates, the magnitude of the rela-
tionship between brain size and cognitive measures accounts for
13–18% of the variance when phylogenetic relatedness between
taxa is taken out of the analysis (Reader and Laland, 2002). What
this implies is that enlarged brains might be a necessary, but
not a sufficient, factor in explaining innovativeness, tool use and
social learning, whether this is in non-humans or in hominins.
Other factors, be they environmental (e.g., spatially and tempo-
rally unpredictable resources) or behavioral (e.g., boldness, low
neophobia) need to be considered.
In non-humanprimates, up to 26 different measures have been
used to document lifestyle, cognitive, life history and evolution-
ary predictors of encephalization [reviewed in Lefebvre (2012)].
These range from log absolute mass of the whole brain, to the
ratio of non-visual cortex volume divided by volume of the rest of
the brain minus the cerebellum, to residuals of isocortex volume
regressed against brainstem volume. Eighteen of the 26 measures
use somemeasure of isocortex volume, removing or not the visual
areas and adding or not the volume of the striatum. Structures
used in allometric corrections of isocortex volume include the
whole brain, the medulla, the brainstem (mesencephalon plus
medulla oblongata), and the brain minus the isocortex (usually
termed “rest of brain”).
In hominins, fossil data are almost always limited to estimates
of endocranial volume, often inferred from incomplete crania
(note that shape can also be analysed in some cases, e.g., Bruner,
2004; Gordon et al., 2004). We thus cannot do largescale analyses
on hominins using the most popular structure for non-human
primates, the isocortex, nor correct for allometry with intra-brain
measures like the brainstem or the “rest of brain.” Largescale tests
on hominins can only be done on whole brain size and allometric
corrections done with body size, which can be selected naturally
or sexually independently of brain size and vary more than the
brain as a consequence of nutrition and disease. These limita-
tions must be kept inmind when comparing variation in hominin
brain size with that of non-human primates.
Henneberg and colleagues (Mathers and Henneberg, 1996;
Henneberg, 1998; de Miguel and Henneberg, 1999, 2001;
Henneberg and de Miguel, 2004) have collated the available
data for brain and body size in hominins from 3.2 million
to 10,000 years BP. Absolute values from their database are
plotted in Figures 1A,B, excluding robust species Paranthropus,
Australopithecus boisei, and A. robustus. Brain size is plotted as
absolute volume, to emphasize the constant increase over time,
while body size is plotted as log transformed kg, to emphasize
the variation, both within and between time periods that is much
larger than that of brain size. Some of the values (blue triangles)
on the body size graph are so large that they represent outliers,
possibly very large males in periods of high sexual dimorphism.
The absence of similar outliers in the brain size graph is typical of
dimorphism trends in non-human primates, where large sex dif-
ferences in body size are often accompanied by small differences
in brain size.
Henneberg and de Miguel (2004; see their Figure 1) point out
the continuous nature of the parallel trends in brain and body
size over time. If we were working with birds or non-human pri-
mates, however, we would examine actual allometrically corrected
encephalization measures, using either residuals of log brain size
regressed against log body size or ratios, which can be calculated
as simple brain mass divided by body mass or as EQ, the ratio of
FIGURE 1 | Hominin brain and body size as a function of time from 3.2
million to 10,000 years BP. Data from Henneberg and colleagues,
excluding robust species and data points for which species identity is
uncertain. (A) Absolute brain size in cc. (B) Log transformed body size in
kg; triangles in (B) represent very large individuals.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 245 | 4
Lefebvre Bird, primate, and hominin brains
observed brain mass divided by the mass expected for the average
member of body size × in a given taxonomic group. Brain and
body estimates in such cases are normally taken from the same
individuals; alternatively, brain mass is measured from fresh tis-
sue or endocrania, and body mass taken from a standard source
of species-typical mass, for example Dunning (2008) for birds.
For hominins, the problem is that fossils used for brain and body
size estimates are rarely from the same individual. We thus cannot
simplymatch an individual brain size data point with its matching
body size in the Henneberg database.
One solution is to use the gaps in the fossil record and the
divisions in hominin clades to calculate a series of average brain
and body masses for particular time periods. Table 1 presents one
way of dividing the fossil record into time periods. It separates
the clades recognized in Henneberg’s database (Australopithecus
afarensis, A. africanus, Homo habilis, H. erectus, archaic Homo
sapiens, Neanderthal, and modern H. sapiens), eliminating cases
where species identification is uncertain [e.g., entries 114–123
in de Miguel and Henneberg (1999)]. Given the long history of
H. erectus and the large amount of body size variation seen in this
clade, the table separates this species into four time periods.
Figures 2, 3 illustrate the changes over time in the averaged
data. Figure 2 shows averaged absolute brain and body size over
the clades and periods. The validity of the divisions in Table 1
is supported by the small standard errors of the mean for time
periods and brain size; in line with the large amount of body
size variation obvious in Figure 1B, SEM’s in Figure 2B are quite
large on the y-axis. Figure 3 shows averaged allometrically cor-
rected brain size according to four methods: brain/body ratio, EQ
according to Jerison’s (1973) formula, EQ according to Martin’s
(1981) formula and residuals of log brain regressed against log
body size. In the last case, a reference group is required to yield
the regression line with respect to which a hominin data point is
to be compared. Here, I use brain and body size for contempo-
rary Catarhines (apes and Old World monkeys), the clade that
hominins belong to, adding to this data set the hominin data
Table 1 | Brain and body size averaged for time periods and clades
(data based on Henneberg and colleagues).
Clade Time span Mean time Mean br Mean body
(k years BP) (k years BP) (cc) (kg)
af 3200–3246 3223 425.83 43.13
aa 2585–2622 2603 477.24 43.20
hh 1803–1855 1829 635.98 51.44
he 1612–1682 1647 882.11 49.50
he 1137–1250 1193 890.37 60.00
he 877–884 881 883.32 68.30
ahs 612–650 631 1224.66 52.80
he 323–400 362 1066.53 51.66
n 47–51 49 1496.50 60.00
hs 38–40 39 1471.22 66.25
Abbreviations: af, Australopithecus afarensis; aa, Australopithecus africanus; hh,
Homo habilis; he, Homo erectus; ahs, archaic Homo sapiens; n, Neanderthal; hs,
Homo sapiens.
point for a given period and repeating the regression for each time
and/or clade division in Table 1.
The striking thing about Figures 2, 3 is that all methods yield
the same qualitative trends: the periods of maximum increase in
both absolute or allometrically corrected brain size are the same:
from 1.83 to 1.65, 0.88 to 0.63, and 0.36 to 0.05 My BP. This sug-
gests that different ways of calculating hominin encephalization
produce similar results, at least for the temporal and taxonomic
divisions used here. Other ways of splitting the hominin data
might yield different results, but the exercise attempted here at
least supports the idea that the method used to calculate hominin
FIGURE 2 | Changes over time in absolute brain and body size
averaged for periods and clades. (A) Absolute brain volume (in cc).
(B) absolute body mass (in kg) over time. Data from Henneberg and
colleagues; errors bars on the x and y axes represent SEM’s. Abbreviations
above each data point in (A) correspond to the ten clades in Table 1; data
points in (B) as in (A).
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FIGURE 3 | Changes over time in allometrically corrected brain and
body size averaged for periods and clades. (A) Brain size corrected
for body size according to Jerison’s EQ. (B) Brain size corrected for
body size according to Martin’s EQ. (C) brain/body ratio. (D) Studentized
residuals of log brain size regressed against log body size. Data points
as in Figure 2.
encephalization trends does not have a strong effect on conclu-
sions. The exercise also suggests that absolute hominin brain size
yields similar temporal trends to those obtained with allometric
corrections.
Two of the cognitive measures known to correlate with
encephalization in birds and non-human primates, innovation
and tool use, can be compared to the temporal trends in hominin
brain size. Stout (2011) has proposed an ordinal scale of complex-
ity changes over time for hominin tool innovations. The measures
of complexity are based on archeological data, on inferences con-
cerning mental operations, as well as observations and brain
imaging of skilled contemporary stone toolmakers (Stout and
Cheminade, 2007, 2009, 2012; Stout et al., 2011). The scale, albeit
ordinal on the y-axis, fits remarkably well with Henneberg’s con-
tinuous data on absolute brain size changes over time (Figure 4).
The overall message here is that hominin encephalization
trends over time appear to be robust to the method used to
estimate them, and that the relationship between tool use, inno-
vations and brain size that shows convergent co-evolution in birds
and non-human primates [see Figure 2 in Lefebvre et al. (2004)]
might also apply to hominins.
COLONIZATION AND BEHAVIORAL DRIVE
In the early 1980’s, Wilson and colleagues (Wyles et al., 1983;
Wilson, 1985) proposed that the combination of innovatiness,
social learning and large brains might have an accelerating
effect on the pace of evolution. The example they used was
that of the Swaythling bottle opening culture mentioned in the
first part of this article. Birds do not digest the carbohydrates
in milk, only the lipids. However, if a mutation in digestive
enzymes were to occur that gave its avian bearer the equiva-
lent of mammalian lactase, this mutation would easily become
fixed in bottle opening birds, but not in birds that do not face
a situation where the mutation provides an advantage. Once
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the lactase equivalent mutation results in a survival and repro-
ductive advantage for the bearer and its descendants, several
consequences may follow. First, any other trait that facilitates the
one first selected might also be selected. Secondly, the new lines
of lactose-digesting bottle openers might start diverging from
their ancestral population, if only by the increased advantage
they derive from urban and suburban habitats. The implica-
tion is that both the rate of evolution of different traits and
the rate of divergence of populations may increase as a result
of what Wilson and colleagues call “behavioral drive.” Mayr’s
(1965) idea that behaviorally flexible species might succeed bet-
ter than conservative ones at invading new habitats complements
Wilson’s ideas quite well and leads to the prediction that inno-
vative clades should be better colonizers and show a greater
species and subspecies diversity than less innovative ones. Sol
and colleagues have shown, for birds introduced to New Zealand
(Sol and Lefebvre, 2000) and in other areas of the world (Sol
et al., 2002, 2005a) that colonization success can be predicted
by brain size and by innovation rate in the country of origin.
Several species from the genus Corvus, the most innovative avian
genus, have a very high colonization success and are consid-
ered pests, e.g., Corvus splendens in Africa, Singapore and the
Arabian peninsula, C. macrorhynchos in Japan, C. corax in the
American southwest. Successful mammal colonizers also have
larger brains than unsuccessful ones (Sol et al., 2008), as do
amphibians and reptiles (Amiel et al., 2011), but not fish (Drake,
2007).
The genus Homo, which Wells and Stock (2007) call “the colo-
nizing ape,” has succeeded in invading almost every habitat on
the surface of the earth, from the coldest to the hottest, from
FIGURE 4 | Ordinal tool complexity scale (red circles) from Stout (2011)
plotted over absolute brain size (in cc) as a function of time from 3.2
million to 10,000 years BP. Scale on right indicates ordinal increases in tool
complexity. Abbreviations refer to categories in Stout (2011) Figure 2. UO,
unifacial Oldowan; BO, bifacial Oldowan; KA, karari; CLCT, core LCT; FLCT,
flake LCT; HC, hierarchical centripetal; CV, cleaver variants; RS, refined
shaping; BL, blades; OP, other predetermined; LV, Levallois variants.
the driest to the wettest. Templeton (2002, 2005) has analyzed
evolutionary trees of human haplotypes and pinpointed three
major historical events that led to gene flow out of Africa, dated
at approximately 1.9 million, 650,000, and 130,000 years ago.
How do these dates compare to the temporal trends in brain size
plotted in Figures 1, 2, 3? Repeated “out-of-Africa” events are rea-
sonably close in time to the peaks in brain size, allometrically
corrected or not, that characterize the averaged data per clade
and time period. Figure 5A shows the three major “out-of-Africa”
emigration events identified by Templeton’s (2002, 2005) analyses
FIGURE 5 | Dates of major hominin emigration events out of Africa
(arrows) according to Templeton’s (2002, 2005) plotted against
(A) studentized residuals of log brain size regressed against log body
size averaged for the time periods and clades presented in Table 1.
(B) Continuous change of log absolute brain size as a function of time from
3.2 million to 10,000 years BP.
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plotted against residual brain size. The coincidence of these emi-
gration events with continuous changes in absolute brain size over
time is more difficult to see (Figure 5B).
One important factor behind Wilson’s interest in behav-
ioral drive was the possibility that evolutionary rates might
vary between clades. Wilson was one of the pioneers of molec-
ular clocks (Wilson et al., 1987) and famously proposed the
“Mitochondrial Eve” hypothesis (Cann et al., 1987) as well as
the 4–5 million years divergence date between the chimpanzee
and hominin lineages (Wilson and Sarich, 1969). One predic-
tion of behavioral drive is that large-brained, innovative taxa
should show accelerated rates of evolution. Recent molecular
analyses (Curnoe et al., 2006) suggest that speciation times for
hominoids (0.66My) were much faster than those that char-
acterize other primates (1.1My), as well as mammals in gen-
eral (2.2My, Avise et al., 1998). Accelerated speciation times,
combined with the increased potential for separation of popu-
lations due to greater colonization success, might also lead to
a higher diversification rate. In birds, the number of species
(Nicolakakis et al., 2003) and subspecies (Sol et al., 2005b)
per clade correlates with innovation rate and brain size. It is
difficult to ascertain the number of species and subspecies in
the hominin clade, but estimates based on fossils range from
5 species to 23, with a median of 14 (Curnoe and Thorne,
2003). Probability estimates also vary greatly from 8 to 27 species
(Bokma et al., 2012). The possibility that several species and
subspecies of hominins may have evolved and gone extinct
over a relatively short timeline, as well as within overlapping
periods, would be a logical extension of the behavioral drive
hypothesis.
CONCLUSION
This article attempts to summarize convergent trends in inno-
vation, tool use, cultural transmission, and brain size in birds
and non-human primates, and then see if the trends are use-
ful in thinking about hominin evolution. Phylogenetic influences
on hominin evolution have been the focus of much work, based
on important field and captive studies of great apes, in partic-
ular chimpanzees and orangutans. Recent work on innovation
and tool use in corvids (Hunt and Gray, 2003) and capuchins
(Fragaszy et al., 2004) should remind us, however, that we have
much to learn from thinking about hominin intelligence in
terms of convergent, multiple independent evolutionary events.
To understand the intelligence of Homo, the most invasive and
opportunistic primate genus, an invasive and opportunistic avian
genus like Corvus might be as useful as the currently dwindling
and geographically limited populations of our closest sister taxa
Pan, Gorilla, and Pongo.
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